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LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff & Respondent 
v, 
JEAN ASAY, 
Defendant & Appellant 
v. 
DONNA NELSON & HARPER R. NELSON, 
Third Party Defendants 
Case No. 87-0161CA 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is granted the Court 
by 78-4-11 and 78-2a-3(2)(c), Utah Code Annotated. 
Proceedings before the Circuit Court resulted in a 
judgment being entered in favor of Appellant/Third Party 
Plaintiff Jean Asay, as to Respondent/Third Party Defendants 
Nelson. However, because that judgment did not include 
attorney's fees awarded the LDS Credit Union as part of its 
judgment against Jean Asay or her own attorney's fees, this 
appeal was instituted. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Limited to Respondents Nelsons, the issues presented by 
this appeal are: 
1. Whether the Third Party Defendants made a valid 
profer of judgment. 
2. Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney's fees 
from Respondents Nelson as part of her judgment. 
3. While not discussed by Appellant in her Brief, 
whether this appeal is moot by reason of Jean Asay's 
acceptance of a check from the Nelsons in full satisfaction 
of the judgment from which these proceedings were taken. 
STATUTES & RULES DETERMINATIVE 
Contrary to Appellant's Brief, Respondents Nelson do 
not believe that Rule 68(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
or 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, are determinative of the 
issues pertaining to this appeal of Asay's judgment against 
the Nelsons. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of two separate judgments 
rendered in the Circuit Court. For purposes of convenience, 
these judgments will be referred to as the "McPhie Judgment" 
and the "Katz Judgment", reflecting the counsel who prepared 
those pleadings on behalf of their respective clients, the 
LDS Credit Union and Harper and Donna Nelson. 
Both of the subject judgments arose out of the 
execution of promissory notes by Jean Asay in favor of the 
LDS Credit Union. The proceeds of the initial loan 
($711.50) were admittedly placed in the Nelsons' account 
with the Credit Union and used to cover check overdrafts. 
After Ms. Asay defaulted in payments due under the 
second loan with the Credit Union, which loan represented a 
refinance of the first obligation, this suit was instituted 
-2-
by Plaintiff. In response to Plaintiff's complaint, an 
Answer and Counterclaim was filed by Jean Asay, as well as a 
Third Party Complaint against the Nelsons, 
The Nelsons, who did not participate in any pre-trial 
motions or discovery proceedings, but for their appearance 
at a deposition taken by Plaintiff Credit Union, made an 
Offer of Judgment prior to trial of the case. The judgment 
entered pursuant to that Offer was thereafter satisfied by 
the Nelsons after numerous proceedings which will be 
described in greater detail below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about June 6, 1984, Jean Asay executed a note 
payable to LDS Credit Union in the sum of $5,000.00, which 
funds were placed into the deposit account of Donna Nelson 
(Paragraph k of Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint of 
Jean Asay). Over the course of several months following 
that loan, proceeds thereof were used to cover overdrafts on 
Third Party Defendants1 checking account all in the total 
sulm of $711.50. There is no dispute that Third Party 
Defendants Nelson received the benefit of those funds and 
did not repay the same to either Asay or the Credit Union 
(Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Asay's Third Party Complaint). There 
is, however, no evidence in the record of a demand for 
payment. 
Following an apparent default by Asay in payment of 
amounts owed under the note, suit was instituted by 
Plaintiff for collection. Defendant thereupon filed a 
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counterclaim alleging a mishandling of loan proceeds by the 
Credit Union. Further, a Third Party Complaint was brought 
against the Nelsons seeking a judgment of $711.50, and "for 
such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable'1 (Third Party Complaint of Jean Asay) . A review 
of the entire record incident to this case reveals that no 
answer was filed on the part of the Nelsons, nor did they 
engage in any pre-trial motions or discovery. 
Filing of that Third Party Complaint was the apparent 
result of testimony given by the Nelsons at a deposition 
conducted by Plaintiff's counsel on or about May 14, 1986. 
At that time, the nature and existence of the debt was 
admitted by Third Party Defendants. Pursuant to that 
acknowledgement of liability, on October 23, 1986, the 
Nelsons offered to pay the full amount of the $711.50 in 
satisfaction of the Asay claim (Appendix A to this Brief). 
This offer was, however, rejected by Third Party Plaintiff. 
The matter proceeded to trial on January 27, 1987, 
before the Honorable LeRoy Griffiths. Consistent with their 
earlier admission of liability for the $711.50 debt, the 
Nelsons submitted both orally and in writing an Offer of 
Judgment to the Court. No objections were received to that 
Offer. Instead, it was accepted by Jose Luis Trujillo, 
counsel for Third Party Plaintiff (Statements of David 
McPhie at page 6, lines 5-13 and statements by the Court, 
transcript of hearing held on March 19, 1987). By reason of 
Appellant's acceptance of the Offer of Judgment, the Nelsons 
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did not participate any further in the trial proceedings, 
and, in fact, Third Party Defendant's counsel left the Court 
(statements of David McPhie at page 6, , transcript of the 
March 6, 1987 hearing). Important to the present appeal, 
that offer was expressly limited to principal, interest and 
court costs owed Third Party Plaintiff and did not include 
any attorney's fees of either Jean Asay or as might be 
awarded by way of pass through to LDS Credit Union. 
Two different orders were then submitted by counsel for 
Plaintiff and Third Party Plaintiff. This was necessitated 
by Mr. McPhief s refusal to include a pass through of 
attorney's fees to the Nelsons which was awarded by the 
Court at the conclusion of trial (transcript of March 19, 
1987 hearing, pages 4 and 5, lines 22-25 and 1-9, 
respectively). Objections were made to the award of 
attorney's fees by pleadings and at a hearing held before 
the Court on the various issues on March 19, 1987. 
Following extensive argument and testimony by counsel 
for all parties, the Court reduced attorney's fees awarded 
LDS Credit Union and further rescinded its prior deter-
mination that those fees should be passed through by way of 
judgment against the Nelsons (statements by the Court at 
pages 33-36, transcript of March 19, 1987 hearing). The 
grounds underlying the Court's ruling on these various 
points will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Immediately after the Court's execution of a Judgment 
submitted by counsel for the Nelsons, a check in the full 
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amount thereof was submitted to Ms. Asay's counsel, together 
with a Satisfaction of Judgment (Motion for Entry of 
Satisfaction of Judgment). Because the Satisfaction was not 
executed by Ms. Asay or her counsel, the Nelsons were 
required to bring a motion before the Court for entry. This 
motion was granted and a Satisfaction signed by Judge 
Griffiths on June 8, 1987. (See Appendix ,fBff) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant is bound by her acceptance of Nelsons' 
Offer of Judgment and her recovery is therefore limited to 
amounts paid pursuant thereto. Any technical defect was 
waived. 
2. Appellant is not entitled to her attorney's fees 
from Third Party Defendants by reason of her failure to 
plead therefore, offer any evidence at trial thereof, and 
the fact that no frivilous defenses were posed by the 
Nelsons to her Third Party Complaint. Nor is Appellant 
entitled to pass through attorney's fees awarded the LDS 
Credit Union to Respondent Nelsons. 
3. By her acceptance of sums representing the 
judgment awarded against the Nelsons, Asay's appeal is moot 
and should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR 
ADDITIONAL SUMS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE AWARDED IN THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BY THE COURT PER APPELLANT'S ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER 
OF JUDGMENT. 
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Appellant's primary argument as to Respondent Nelsons 
is her entitlement to a pass through of attorney's fees 
awarded Plaintiff LDS Credit Union. Judge Griffiths refused 
to allow a pass through on two principal grounds, to wit: 
that the acceptance of an offer of judgment by Third Party 
Plaintiff barred any additional award and; that a pass 
through would be inequitable because the Credit Union's fees 
were incurred solely as a result of Appellant's vigorous 
defense in the underlying collection action. As the first 
of these reasons is premised upon Third Party Defendants' 
Offer of Judgment under Rule 65(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, construction and interpretation thereof is 
required to resolve this appeal. 
Similar to their earlier proposals to settle the case, 
Third Party Defendants made their Offer of Judgment in order 
to avoid an award of attorney's fees to Third Party 
Defendants, though Ms. Asay's entitlement thereto was 
disputed and believed to be without any foundation. 
Respondent's intent in making the Offer was thus consistent 
with Rule 65 whereby an acceptance of the offer precludes 
any award of further costs and attorney's fees. 
Appellant in reliance on alleged technical defects, 
principally the timeliness of the Offer, argues that she is 
not bound by the acceptance and, hence, may seek her 
attorney's fees and those passed through from Plaintiff. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that such awards would be 
warranted, she has, however, waived those defects and is 
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bound and limited to the sums set forth in the Offer and 
reduced to judgment by the Court. 
That a claimant may waive defects in an Offer of 
Judgment is established by Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture and 
Carpet Company, 48 Utah 434, 160 p. 283 (1916), under a 
predecessor to Rule 68. There the defendant failed to make 
a proper tender into court of the amount necessary to 
discharge the claim. However, by reasons of Plaintiff's 
failure to note that the money was not produced, the court 
held that he had waived his rights to object. And while 
there is not a determinative case under Rule 68 eminating 
from Utah, there are numerous federal cases under the 
similarly-worded Rule 68 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
which offer insight. 
Importantly, when making an offer of judgment, 
defendant is not requried to itemize amounts being tendered. 
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). Similarly, in Lyon's v. 
Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. 1147 (N.Y. 1983) where a 
defendant's offer did not include an amount for attorney's 
fees, it did not make that offer defective for purposes of 
Rule 68, 
Appellant, having accepted the Nelsons' Offer of 
Judgment is precluded from seeking additional amounts, 
including attorney's fees. 
POINT II. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY ENTITLEMENT 
TO AN AWARD OF HER ATTORNEY'S FEES OR A PASS THROUGH OF 
THOSE FEES GRANTED THE CREDIT UNION. 
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Utah is among those majority of states which allow a 
successful litigant his attorney's fees only if they are 
provided for by statute or a contract between the parties. 
Because there is not contract between Appellant and 
Respondents Nelson and as admitted by counsel in Appellant's 
Brief, the only possible grounds for an award is 78-27-56, 
Utah Code Annotated. Without quoting that provision 
extensively, it allows a grant of attorney's fees if the 
court determines that the defense was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. Ms. Asay's appeal must 
fail on this issue for two very simple reasons. (1) There 
was no defense raised in this case by the Nelsons; and (2) 
assuming there was a defense, Third Party Plaintiff failed 
to put on any evidence as to bad faith in connection 
therewith. 
As stated above and as apparent from even a cursory 
review of the record, the Nelsons did not file an Answer in 
this case nor raise any defense to the Third Party 
Complaint. Thus, on this very simple level, Appellant is 
unable to make out any claim of frivilous defense. It is 
inconceivable that a failure to file an answer nor pursue 
any pretrial discovery could rise to this threshold level. 
But even apart from this deficiency, Ms. Asay has not put on 
any evidence of the Nelsons' "bad faith", which issue is 
clearly a question of fact requiring competent evidence or 
testimony. Counsel's bare unsupported statements in Point V 
of his Brief are not only blatant, objectionable heresay 
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statements but are further contradicted by the Nelsons1 
offer to settle this case immediately after filing of the 
Third Party Complaint and long before any trial on the 
merits. 
As a third and final reason for denying Third Party 
Plaintiff her attorney's fees, Respondents Nelson note 
counsel's failure to put on any evidence thereof at the 
trial of this case. Under numerous rulings of the Utah 
Supreme Court, fees can only be awarded if supported by the 
testimony or affidavit of that party's attorney. See 
generally Turtle Management v. Haggis Management, 645 P. 2d 
667 (1982), and Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. 
Cox, 627 P. 2d 62 (1981) . 
Although not specifically addressed in Appellant's 
Brief, it is perhaps appropriate to here briefly argue the 
merits of any pass through of the Credit Union's fees to the 
Nelsons. It was previously believed that this would be the 
crux of Third Party Plaintiff's appeal. 
In what can best be described as a plea for equity, the 
Nelsons have consistently argued that attorney's fees 
awarded the Credit Union could not and should not be passed 
through as originally occurred at trial. It was, at least 
in part, these equitable considerations which prompted the 
Court to rescind its prior award at the March 19, 1987 
hearing. And the Court's ruling on this issue is amply 
supported by a record which indicates that no action on the 
part of the Nelsons resulted in attorney's fees being 
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incurred by either Plaintiff or Defendant Asay. Instead, at 
all pertinent times commencing with the Nelsons1 deposition, 
they have admitted liability and pursued
 #full settlement of 
the claim. In fact, the vast majority of pretrial 
proceedings which resulted in Plaintiff incurring attorney's 
fees took place prior to the filing of any Third Party 
Complaint against the Nelsons. As the Court cogently 
observed, 
. . . but I hadn't considered this problem of the 
Nelsons being in a position of not being able to 
help themselves. They had offered to settle for 
what the principal amount, but Asay didn't want 
that, because that was against her position in the 
case. 
And so, because Asay made that decision, she 
required the attorney for the Credit Union to 
continue to put time and effort into it and run up 
the bill, and she prevented the Nelsons from doing 
anything of minimizing their costs, because their 
position was opposite of her position. 
(Transcript of the March 19, 1987 hearing at page 
35). 
So, even to the extent that Appellant may succeed in showing 
the Offer of Judgment to be defective, she is still not 
entitled to a pass through of the Credit Union's attorney's 
fees by way of her judgment against the Nelsons. 
POINT III. MS. ASAY'S APPEAL IS MOOT BY HER ACCEPTANCE 
OF PROCEEDS FROM THE "KATZ JUDGMENT". 
While this point was argued as part of Respondents 
Nelson's Motion to Dismiss this appeal, a ruling on which 
was deferred, a brief review is helpful. 
Under a long line of legal precedent dating back to 
Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Company, 56 Utah 190, 
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188 P. 1117 (1920), the Utah Supreme Court has held that one 
who accepts a benefit under a judgment is estopped from 
later attacking that judgment on appeal. Hence, whereas 
here, a prevailing party accepts sums under his judgment 
and, accordingly, a satisfaction is entered, that party is 
precluded from challenging the judgment on appeal. 
A recent case construing the "acceptance of benefit 
doctrine" is Trees v. Lewis, 56 Utah Advance Reports 8 
(1987). There, the appellant cashed checks from a 
respondent pursuant to the assailed judgment. Regardless of 
appellant's statements that "he did not intend to waive his 
right to appeal", the court found that a dismissal of the 
appeal was appropriate. Id. at 8. Application of the rule 
formulated in Trees v. Lewis and prior cases cited therein 
should result in dismissal of this pending appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents Nelson urged that this appeal be dismissed 
and the judgment entered by the lower court upheld. A 
dismissal is justified due to Appellant's acceptance of the 
benefits flowing from the assailed judgment. And on the 
merits of the case, Circuit Judge Griffiths was correct in 
ruling that Third Party Plaintiff was not entitled to her 
own attorney's fees nor a pass through of fees awarded 
the Credit Union against her. This ruling was correct by 
reason of both an acceptance of the Nelsons' Offer of 
Judgment and equity as well. 
Lastly, Respondents Nelson's request in award of 
attorney's fees incurred in defending against this frivilous 
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appeal which is clearly moot in view of the above cited 
legal authority. 
DATED this day of September, 1987. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
BY 
Michael A. Katz 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of September, 
1987, four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Glen J. Ellis, Esq. 
ELLIS & ELLIS 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84603 
David McPhie, Esq. 
3450 South Highland Drive 
Suite 301 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84106 
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GARRETT AND STURDY 
EDWARD M. 6ARRETT A T T O R N E Y S A T U * W 
THOMAS C. STURDY Si 1 SOUTH STATE SUITE 320 
JOSEPH E HATCH SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH S4II1 
MKXAEL A. KATZ TELEPHONE 801 -532-2707 
October 23, 1986 
Mr. Jose Luis Trujillo 
Attornev at Law 
967 East 4800 South, Suite 3A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Re: L.D.S. Church Employees Credit Union v. Jean Asay v. 
Harper and Dona Nelson; Our File No. 5383 
Dear Mr. Trujillo: 
In response to your correspondence dated September 26, 
1986, I have been authorized to offer $711.50 on behalf of 
my clients, Harper and Dona Nelson, for settlement in the 
above case. The Nelsons will, however, require 30 days to 
raise the sums sufficient to pay that amount. I must state 
unequivocably that your client would not be entitled to 
additional sums, including specifically attorney's fees and, 
hence, we will make no accommodations in that regard. 
Please contact me within seven days of this letter with 
your response. Once again, in the meantime I will not be 
filing an Answer to the Third Party Complaint you have filed 
in Ms. Asay's behalf. 
Very truly yours, 
•JTrT^NSTURDY 
. v . 
Michael A. Katz 
MAK/lam 
cc: Harper and Dona Nelson 
APPENDIX "A" 
Michael A. Katz, #3817 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
ATTORNEYS FOR Third Party Defendants 
Jit SOUTH STATE STUEET 
SUITE 320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH • 4111 
TELEPHONE IS01I 332-2707 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
L.D.S. CHURCH EMPLOYEES 
CREDIT UNION, a Utah ] 
corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JEAN ASAY, ] 
Defendant and ] 
Third Party Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DONA NELSON and ] 
HARPER R. NELSON, ) 
Third Party Defendants. ) 
1
 " " ' — « » — • ^ — — — • i ii — • — i — 
i SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 85CVM-06470 
Third Party Defendants Dona Nelson and Harper R. 
Nelson's Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment having come 
before the Court for hearing on May 28, 1987, Michael A. 
Katz appearing on behalf of Third Party Defendants and the 
Court having heard the arguments of counsel and having read 
and considered the Motion, and finding good cause therefor; 
APPENDIX "B" 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Judgment previously entered by the Court in favor of Third 
Party Plaintiff Jean Asay and against Thijrd Party Defendants 
Dona Nelson and Harper R. Nelson in the sura of $1,202.50 is 
fully satisfied and discharged and the Clerk is directed to 
enter this Satisfaction of Judgment pursuant thereto. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Satisfaction of Judgment was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ~2Jb~~ day of May, 1987, to Mr. Glen J. Ellis, 
Attorney at Law, 60 East 100 South, #102, P. 0. Box 1097, 
Provo, Utah 84603; and Mr. David McPhie, Attorney at Law, 
3450 So. Highland Drive, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84106. 
